Sacramento Personal Injury Lawyer Blog

The following blog entry is written to illustrate an example of a personal injury case. Reviewing this kind of lawsuit should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury lawsuit and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff's physicians took him back to surgery on September. 2, for thecal decompression and exploratory surgery. After the decompression of the fluid collection, he was discharged home approximately two weeks later, with minimal improvement in his condition. In mid-October, Plaintiff was seen by a neurosurgeon and diagnosed with bilateral lower extremity saddle paresthesia, penile/scrotum anesthesia, urinary and fecal incontinence, paresthesia lateral and posterior aspects of both legs and pedal and lower extremity edema. He was told that the symptoms have been present for so long that the damage was permanent.

A further evaluation was performed on January 13, 2008, in Sacramento. Plaintiff was diagnosed with cauda equina syndrome and chronic pain syndrome due to cauda equina compression by post-operative fluid following the August 19, 2006 spine surgery. The physician noted that Plaintiff manifested the symptoms of cauda equina syndrome nearly immediately after surgery. The doctor stated when cauda equina symptoms are present, the standard of care requires it to be addressed expeditiously as an emergency.

Plaintiff and his wife sued the United States (which runs the VA hospitals). They claimed that post-operative changes were symptoms of cauda equina syndrome, which is an emergency requiring prompt surgical intervention to reduce pressure on the cauda equina nerves. Further, they argued that the U.S. government health care providers were negligent in failing to timely respond to his post-operative cauda equina syndrome by decompressing the nerves in a timely manner.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Man Severely Injured When Sacramento Doctors Failed To Provide a Proper Diagnsis, Part 2 of 2" »

The following blog entry is written to illustrate an example of a personal injury case. Reviewing this kind of lawsuit should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury lawsuit and its proceedings.)

INJURIES: Plaintiff claimed he sustained cauda equina syndrome, chronic pain syndrome, loss of a leg due to amputation, bowel/bladder incontinence, and loss of sexual function. He said he suffers from intense pain on a daily basis and continues to have decreased sensation of lower extremities described as a “dead” leg below the knee. He uses a walker to ambulate short distances, cannot walk on his own and cannot drive.

Facts:
In August 2006, Plaintiff, 64, a retiree, presented to the ABC Hospital complaining of lower back pain and left leg pain, which he said was worse with activity. A decision was made to perform an L4-5 and L5-S1 laminectomy with transforaminal lumbar interbody fusion at L4-5. A preoperative examination of Plaintiff revealed no weakness with, and he did not have problems with, bowel function, urination or sexual function or any difficulty walking.

On August 19, Plaintiff underwent the recommended back surgery. The next day, a nurse noted that Plaintiff complained of numbness in the scrotum, inability to feel sensation and a dull sensation in his right leg. The symptoms persisted and worsened. By that evening,

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Delayed Diagnosis Causes Serious Damages in Sacramento Personal Injury Case, Part 1 of 2" »

The following blog entry is written to illustrate an example of a personal injury case. Reviewing this kind of lawsuit should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury lawsuit and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff made a claim for subluxation of his C7-8 vertebrae leaving him an incomplete quadriplegia from nipples down, acute respiratory distress syndrome, leukocytosis, thrombocytosis, dysphagia, polydipsia, anxiety, nyponatremia, hypokalemia, acute renal failure, post-trauma pulmonary insufficiency, hyposmolality, pneumonia, post hemorrhagic anemia, constipation, neuogenic bladder and bowel, abnormal glucose, cardiac dysrhythmias and autonomic dysreflexia, hyperglycemia, C3-C4 and C4-C5 disc protrusion, UTIs, insomnia, depression, blisters and ulcers, $947,000 in past medical expenses, $2 million to 5 million in future medical expenses, $120,000 in past lost income, $1.7 million in future lost wages, reduced life expectancy and lost enjoyment of life.

Plaintiff's mother made a claim for loss of her son's consortium. She asserted Plaintiff visited her regularly and maintained her home. She sought $107,000 for loss of household services.

The plaintiffs sought judgment, individually, for general and special damages.

The State of California alleged Plaintiff was comparatively negligent by failing to see the cable and by speeding.

According to plaintiff attorneys, Plaintiff and Mother offered to settle for $5,499,000.

The parties entered mediation proceedings September 25, 2011 and reached a $5,000,000 settlement. Joint Legislative Committee approval was obtained. November 6, 2011.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

The following blog entry is written to illustrate an example of a personal injury case. Reviewing this kind of lawsuit should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury lawsuit and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff, 36, arrived with a friend October 1, 2009 at Access ABC of the ABC Area. The Area land, located in Sacramento County, was owned, managed and supervised by the State of California. Plaintiff rode his 2005 Honda CRF 450 dirt bike into the staging area at approximately 9 a.m., when he hit a cable loosely connected to two portable concrete barriers, lost control of his bike, was thrown into the air and landed on his head. The barriers were allegedly set up by Game and Fish employees.

He was air lifted to the hospital and underwent surgery on his cervical spine, moved to ABC Hospital Oct. 3. He was discharged Dec. 2.

Plaintiff and his mother filed a complaint in the Sacramento County Superior Court against the State of California for gross negligence and negligence.

Plaintiff claimed the cable was brown, not taut, not properly painted or marked by strips of flags. It reportedly sagged to a height of barely five inches above the ground and that vegetation and brush obscured visibility. He was also wearing a helmet, chest protector, riding boots, knee and elbow pads, gloves, and polarized goggles at the time of the incident.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Quadriplegic Man Brings Sacramento Personal Injury Case, Part 1 of 2" »

The following blog entry is written to illustrate a common motion filed during civil litigation. Reviewing this kind of filing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this insurance bad faith lawsuit and its proceedings.)

Universal Street was damaged in 2007, shortly after a sale collapsed. There was no rental income of the property at the time. This is information is known to XYZ, that is why they are denying the claim. The Halls have provided documents showing a sale price for the house two months prior the fire. Since the fire, property values have dropped. This places a variable in the equation that is hard for plaintiffs to adequately calculate a hard figure. Plaintiffs are not required to submit expert opinions at this point, and to guess would not be fair.

Plaintiffs are under the belief that defendants are not willing to accept the amount that plaintiffs are requesting to settle this lawsuit for two reasons: One they want to establish that the plaintiffs damages are over $75,000 per recent Request for Admissions, in order that they may return to federal court, now that all state defendants have been dismissed. Two: they want to maintain the litigation while seeking to lock plaintiffs into a fixed figure before discovery is completed. If these motives are true, in fact, XYZ's motion to compel was brought for improper reasons.

REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS ARE UNWARRANTED

Discovery sanctions should be appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery ... but the court may not impose sanctions which are designed not to accomplish the objects of discovery but rather to impose punishment, as quoted in Vallbona v. Springer, 43 Cal.App.4, 51 Cal Rptr. 2d 311.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Sacramento Insurance Company Asks Court For Meritless Sanctions Against Injured Homeowners, Part 6 of 6" »

The following blog entry is written to illustrate a common motion filed during civil litigation. Reviewing this kind of filing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this insurance bad faith lawsuit and its proceedings.)

XYZ'S ARGUMENT FOR A STATEMENT OF DAMAGES IS WITHOUT MERIT IN THAT THEY ARE ALREADY AWARE OF THE DAMAGES SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF

Plaintiffs Pleaded Damages to be Shown by Proof at Time of Trial

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on May 9, 2008. At the time, plaintiffs were under the belief they were entitled to certain damages and to continue plead such in the First Amended Complaint, until proof may be obtained. At the time that the statement of damages were requested, plaintiffs produced a certain figure of for their damages. Plaintiffs had not calculated any other damages and asked clarification as to XYZ's interpretation of the Code and what in particular did they additionally want from plaintiffs. XYZ now states plaintiffs are also seeking attorney fees and emotional distress damages.

Plaintiffs' letters as indicated above included the attorney fees that the Halls have paid. As to the emotional distress damages, this has not been determined at this time and this is the first time that XYZ has clarified this issue.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Sacramento Homeowners Seek Emotional Distress Damages From Insurer After Home Was Arsoned, Part 5 of 6" »

http://www.moseleycollins.com/lawyer-attorney-1245027.htmlThe following blog entry is written to illustrate a common motion filed during civil litigation. Reviewing this kind of filing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this insurance bad faith lawsuit and its proceedings.)

ARGUMENT

MOTION TO COMPEL IS BROUGHT FOR AN IMPROPER PURPOSE WHEN ALL FAITHFUL EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO COMPLY WITH REQUESTS

Plaintiffs acted in good faith and with reasonable diligence in their responses to XYZ's questions. Plaintiffs are aware of their obligations to investigate if they lack information (Smith v. Circle P. Ranch Co. Inc. (App. 2 Dist. 1978) 150 Cal.Rptr. 828., however, plaintiffs are not able to answer many of the questions that XYZ has propounded. Plaintiffs have asked XYZ essentially what in particular they are seeking, and XYZ responded, it was not up to them to determine this fact. Well, then how can plaintiffs?

Mr. Hall is 84 years old. Though he is cooperative, he is not one to have long discussions and analysis of facts in one setting. It has taken a series of conversations to get additional facts. His allocation of time is short, and he does not provide all that is necessary immediately. He asks for patience and time when things are requested, in order that he can think and look for items. Plaintiffs responses were not willfully meant to evade or avoid answering.

Plaintiffs have produced all documents in their possession as stated above and there is no further responses as of this date to produce. Plaintiffs did serve the Responses to Document Production, contrary to XYZ statements. XYZ also admits receipt of documents, but because they are few in number, they suggest plaintiffs must be withholding other items and are not responsive. No, plaintiffs do not have any. Plaintiffs only want to settle, and whatever it takes to do so, It is not in their best interest to hide documents.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Sacramento Insurance Company Stalls Settlement With Couple Who Lost Home, Part 4 of 6" »

The following blog entry is written to illustrate a common motion filed during civil litigation. Reviewing this kind of filing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this insurance bad faith lawsuit and its proceedings.)

Special Interrogatories

XYZ served 54 special interrogatories without declaration for plaintiffs to respond. Plaintiffs answered 35 and informed XYZ they should provide a declaration for response to the additional special interrogatories. XYZ provided the declaration and the plaintiffs answered to the best of their ability.

XYZ contends that Mr. Hall's responses to the first 35 special interrogatories and form interrogatories were incomplete and requested further responses without objections. Plaintiffs provided supplemental responses and letter addressing the request. Plaintiffs asked clarification as to what XYZ was seeking. XYZ responded with their letter of January 12, 2009.

Statement of Damages

XYZ sent a statement of damages on November 3, 2008, after plaintiffs had mailed a letter in October 2008 indicating they were willing to settle the case for the cost to repair per the estimate of Clive Lee, water and fire restoration expert, that was submitted to the federal court.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Sacramento Husband And Wife Battle Insurance Company After Arson Loss, Part 3 of 6" »

The following blog entry is written to illustrate a common motion filed during civil litigation. Reviewing this kind of filing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this insurance bad faith lawsuit and its proceedings.)

XYZ states in their motion there is no issue as to Mrs. Hall's response. However, Mrs. Hall responded to the same questions as did Mr. Hall because they are joint plaintiffs and suffer the same loss and seek the same recovery. If XYZ had no issue as to Mrs. Hall's response, then there is no as to Mr. Halls initial responses and supplemental responses. Ms. Hall provided information to the same form interrogatories that Mr. Hall responded.

Request for Production of Documents

In XYZ's motion on page 2, line 11, they state plaintiffs did not respond at all (as to production of documents, then on line 12-14, state plaintiffs produced some documents (despite not responding to the document requests themselves), their production is obviously deficient. Again, XYZ states on page 3, line 24 to page 4, line 2, there was document production. As stated above plaintiffs faxed their pleaded responses to the production of documents on 12/08/08.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Bad Faith By Sacramento Insurance Company Damages Local Family, Part 2 of 6" »

The following blog entry is written to illustrate a common motion filed during civil litigation. Reviewing this kind of filing should help potential plaintiffs and clients better understand how parties in personal injury cases present such issues to the court.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this insurance bad faith lawsuit and its proceedings.)

Plaintiffs William and Susan Hall’s Memorandum of Points in Authority in Opposition to XYZ's Motion to Compel Discovery and Sanctions

INTRODUCTION

XYZ brings a motion to compel further responses and production of documents, and a statement of damages. Plaintiffs have tried diligently to respond to all of XYZ's demands but they are insistent that plaintiffs responses are incomplete. Plaintiffs have responded to the best of their knowledge, yet XYZ refuses to accept the responses. They seem to believe that plaintiffs should respond according to their frame of thoughts or better put, in the way they believe will best serve their interest.

Plaintiffs believe this motion to compel was brought to harass, annoy, and burden plaintiffs and their counsel. As plaintiffs worked steadily to provide the information to XYZ, it appears XYZ was not willing to work toward a resolution, but rather bring the matter before the court for sanction purposes.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On November 3, 2008, the Halls received discovery from XYZ consisting of two sets of Form Interrogatories to Plaintiffs William Hall and Susan Hall respectively; Request for Production of Documents, and Special Interrogatories exceeding 35 in number. William Hall's responses to the form and special interrogatories, and responses to the production of documents were faxed to defendants on December 8, 2008.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Insurance Company Denies Coverage To Sacramento Family After House Fire, Part 1 of 6" »

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this wrongful death case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, Methodist, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury action and its proceedings.)

In Wheeler, supra, the patient, Mr. Wheeler, arrived at the hospital for cardiac tests (in non-emergency circumstances), and he did not read the Consent to Admission form before signing it The court emphasized that no one at the hospital called his attention to the Arbitration Option paragraph, much less explain its implication or the options available, now was he given a copy of the document. Significantly, because Mr. Wheeler suffered injuries in the hospital that left him unable to communicate, the court relied on the declaration of his wife, who had been present with him during the admission process. It stated, "Whether a person signed a document without reading it is an inference which may rationally be drawn by a percipient witness to the circumstances surrounding the event." Id at 362. The court found that "...the uncontradicted evidence shows that Mr. Wheeler was unaware of the existence of the "Arbitration Option" provision." Id at 361. Moreover, under Wheeler, the general presumption that "... ordinarily one who signs a contract is bound by its terms even though he signs it without reading it was held to be ... inapplicable to adhesion-type contracts." Id at 368.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

The principles embodied in Wheeler are paralleled in the present case, especially given the evidence establishing that Mr. Hall arrived at the hospital ER by ambulance, reporting pain at a level of 9-10/10. Given this evidence, Mr. Hall cannot be held responsible to have read and understood the independent contractor clause buried within the Form, nor can this provision of this standard adhesion contract be enforced, as ample authority has firmly established a patient who is in the throes of a medical emergency-or even a non-emergency hospital patient-is not held to the same standards as a healthy individual contemplating a business transaction in a normal situation.

Continue reading "Court Deems Hospital Consent Form A "Contract Of Adhesion" in Sacramento Wrongful Death Suit, Part 9 of 9" »

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this wrongful death case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, Methodist, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury action and its proceedings.)

As the Wheeler court made clear, even a patient who arrives at a hospital at his doctor's direction, under non-emergency circumstances will not be held to terms in a standardized, adhesive admission form that go beyond what the patient could reasonably expect to find in such a document absent a clear showing that he or she was made fully aware of such terms.

The Court stated: The application of adhesion contract principles to an arbitration clause in a contract for medical services presents distinct problems concerning the patient's awareness of the contractual provision and his understanding assent thereto. As Professor Henderson points out in his comprehensive article entitled Contractual Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, supra, 58 Va.L.Rev. 947, at page 987: Given the distinctive nature of the medical services transaction, the use of a standardized form runs the risk of failing to satisfy the policy of awareness.

The arbitration provision, viewed from the perspective of the patient, is indeed subsidiary to the primary exchange of medical services for an undertaking of payment after consenting to medical procedures, the contract purchaser of medical services may fairly assume that no obligations other than that of payment are imposed. Absent some guidance by the medical entity, the patient has little reason to know anything at all about arbitration, let alone that the tendered document requires it. Nor should the medical entity ordinarily expect a patient to read or even to understand a broad arbitration clause. Id at 357-358.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Sacramento Hospital Tries To Force Arbitration On Family In Wrongful Death Case, Part 8 of 9" »

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this wrongful death case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, Methodist, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury action and its proceedings.)

Moreover, the Wheeler court stressed that even a favored arbitration provision in an adhesion contract cannot be enforced unless it was knowingly and voluntarily entered into by both parties. It emphasized, "... notwithstanding the cogency of the policy favoring arbitration and despite frequent judicial utterances that because of that policy every intendment must be indulged in favor of finding an agreement to arbitrate, the policy favoring arbitration cannot displace the necessity for a voluntary agreement to arbitrate." Wheeler, supra, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 356.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Key to this analysis is the requirement that in order to be enforceable, terms in an adhesion contract must be of a type that the parties to such an agreement would reasonably expect to find in the contract. As the Bruni court explained, “ ... a provision contained in [an adhesion] contract cannot be enforced if it does not fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker or adhering party." Bruni, supra at 1289. The Wheeler court pointed out that reasonable expectations of the hospital patient presented with an admission form are significantly different that those of one in a business or employment setting, stating, "... insofar as awareness is concerned, the atmosphere of the employer's office ... is a far cry from that of a hospital admission room." Id at 363. It further explained, "A patient like Mr. Wheeler realistically has no choice but to seek admission to the hospital to which he has been directed by his physician and to sign the printed forms necessary to gain admission. To posit otherwise would require us to ignore the stress, anxiety, and urgency which ordinarily beset a patient seeking hospital admission." Id at 366.

Continue reading "Sacramento Patient Forced To Sign Hospital Consent Form Under Duress, Part 7 of 9" »

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this wrongful death case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, Methodist, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury action and its proceedings.)

In contrast, in our case, the analysis is not burdened by the policy favoring arbitration. Instead, there are at least two strong public policies weighing against the clause's enforceability that must be taken into account: one disfavoring exculpatory provisions in hospital admission agreements purporting to limit liability without clear explanation to the patient; and another favoring the availability of essential medical services to all patients in order to serve the public interest. See Id.

See also, Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 158, 161-162 (Explaining, "...the hospital patient contract clearly falls within the category of agreements affecting the public interest" while distinguishing releases signed by participants in sports or recreational activities, because "... athletic or recreational activities, however enjoyable or beneficial, are not essential, as a hospital is to a patient" [citing Tunkl, supra at 92]); see also Health Net of California, Inc. v. Dept. Of Health Services (2003) 113 Cal. App. 4th 224, 237 (wherein the court, citing Tunkl, concluded that "... an exculpatory clause that is part of a transaction that provides managed health care for Medi-Cal beneficiaries affects the public interest."); City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 747, 762. (See Part 7 of 9.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Sacramento Family Fights Hospital Over Preventable Wrongful Death, Part 6 of 9" »

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this wrongful death case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, Methodist, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury action and its proceedings.)

Perhaps nowhere is the import of these principles more apparent than in the context of the hospital emergency room (ER). California law has long held that especially where, as here, a patient arrives at the ER in a condition impaired by a serious injury or illness, hospital admission forms purporting to circumscribe the hospital's liability constitute adhesion contracts. As the California Supreme Court recognized in Tunkl v. Board of Regents (1963) 60 Cal. 2d 92, 93 The would-be patient is in no position to reject the proffered agreement, to bargain with the hospital, or in lieu of agreement to find another hospital.

The admission room of a hospital contains no bargaining table where, as in a private business transaction, the parties can debate the terms of their contract. As a result, we cannot but conclude that the instant agreement manifested the characteristics of the so-called adhesion contract ... " Id at 102; see also Wheeler, supra, 63 C.A.3d at 357 (wherein the court, relying on Tunkel, held that a hospital's standard printed "Conditions of Admission" constitutes an adhesion contract, especially because a patient being admitted to a hospital is in no position to debate his or her terms of admission).

Significantly, while the admission agreement in Tunkl involved a clause purporting to waive liability, Wheeler involved an arbitration clause-a provision freighted with public policy concerns favoring its application.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Sacramento Hospital Claims Patient Waived Rights In Wrongful Death Case, Part 5 of 9" »

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this wrongful death case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, Methodist, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury action and its proceedings.)

The Consent to Admission Form, or at least the "Independent Contractor" provision, constitutes an unenforceable adhesion contract.

The evidence of record established these facts as undisputed:

1. The admission form signed by Mr. Hall at Universal contained a provision characterizing Universal physicians as independent contractors, which was located approximately two-thirds down from the top of the document.

2. This independent contractor provision was in the same small print as the rest of the document, was not in bold type, highlighted, or in any way emphasized or set apart from the rest of the text so as to draw the reader's notice. Absolutely no evidence was offered suggesting that Mr. Hall's attention was drawn to this provision in any way, either in writing or orally.

3. Mr. Hall was required to sign the form in order to receive admission and treatment at Universal, and had little if any bargaining power under the circumstances (which he was incapable of exercising at that time, even if it existed).

A contract of adhesion has been defined as " ... a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it." Bruni v. Didion (4th App. Dist. 2008) 160 Cal. App. 4th 1272, 1289. Stated another way, " ... a contract of adhesion is a standardized contract drafted by the party with stronger bargaining power, such that the weaker party has no choice other than to accept it or reject it." Id at 1291.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Sacramento Hospital's Delay Results In Patient's Wrongful Death, Part 4 of 9" »

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this wrongful death case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, Methodist, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury action and its proceedings.)

Stanhope was among the authority relied on by the Fourth Appellate District Court in Mejia at 1448, 1454-1459, wherein the Mejia court noted that this rule applies with greater force in cases where the plaintiff-patient is seen in the emergency room, emphasizing its agreement with "...the Stanhope holding that emergency room patients cannot be expected to inquire as to whether treating physicians are independent contractors." Mejia involved a plaintiff whose broken neck was allegedly misdiagnosed by ER physicians, resulting in paralysis. Surveying the law of other jurisdictions, the court observed, " ...because it is commonly believed that hospitals are the actual providers of care, ostensible agency can be readily inferred whenever someone seeks treatment at a hospital." Id at 1456. The Court concluded California law should be interpreted consistently with this majority view.

Alternatively, if Mr. Hall signed the "Consent to Admission" form after receiving a dose of Dilaudid, an opiate-based narcotic, it may be presumed that his judgment was impaired, particularly given the long duration of his severe pain prior to receiving the medication and his declining vital signs. Either way, this dying man could not be held responsible to analyze a legal document he was required to sign in order to receive treatment to ease his misery, as a matter of law. See Mejia, supra, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 1454, 1458-1459.

The application of this general principle-that patients who enter a medical facility under circumstances indicating that they are unable to effectively consider and accept the terms of an agreement they must sign in order to be admitted should not be bound by its terms-has been applied in a broad range of situations. It extends even to patients who are not in pain, medicated, or seeking admission on an emergency basis.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Wrongful Death Suit Involves "Consent To Admission" For Sacramento Patient, Part 3 of 9" »

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this wrongful death case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, Methodist, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury action and its proceedings.)

THE PHYSICIANS WHO DEALT WITH MR. HALL AT UNIVERSAL WERE OSTENSIBLE AGENTS OF THE HOSPITAL, AS A MATTER OF LAW

A. Because he was gravely ill and in severe pain, Mr. Hall lacked the capacity to validly execute a contract, purporting to contain a waiver of rights.

The evidence of record has established these facts as undisputed:

1. Mr. Hall signed the Universal admission form at about the same time he was admitted to the hospital floor on August 11,2008, which the records indicate was approximately 10:30 p.m.

2. At that time of his admission, Mr. Hall had been suffering pain he reported to be 9 - 10/10 for nearly 2 1/2 hours.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

3. Mr. Hall's Universal chart indicates that at approximately 10:30 p.m., he was finally given an intravenous dose of two to three milligrams of Dilaudid (with the usual dose ranging from one to two milligrams when so administered). Dilaudid is a narcotic pain reliever that takes immediate effect when given intravenously, and which may impair thinking and judgment.

Continue reading "Sacramento Personal Injury Case Involves Patient's Wrongful Death, Part 2 of 9" »

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this wrongful death case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, Methodist, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury action and its proceedings.)

Plaintiffs' Motion for Directed Verdict Against Universal Memorial Hospital, Inc. on Ostensible Agency Issue

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs hereby move that the Court determine, as a matter of law, that the Universal Hospital Conditions of Admission form signed by Decedent David Hall, Jr. is an unenforceable with respect to the provision therein stating the physicians attending to him are independent contractors.

The motion is based on two distinct reasons: (1) Because Mr. Hall lacked the responsibility and capacity to validly execute a binding agreement acknowledging such legal relationships and concurrently waiving his rights at the time he signed it; and (2) because the Form constitutes an unenforceable adhesion contract. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court remove the agency issue from consideration by the jury, rule that the clause at issue is void and has no legal effect herein as a matter of law, and further rule that all physicians who attended Mr. Hall during his stay at Universal are declared to be ostensible agents of the hospital, as a matter of law. In addition, Plaintiffs request that the Court instruct the jury that the Universal physicians were ostensible agents of the hospital, as a matter of law. (See Part 2 of 9.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Continue reading "Hospital Consent Form At Issue In Sacramento Wrongful Death Case, Part 1 of 9" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

Mr. Santoro's Damages are Straightforward and Largely Undisputed
Defendants suggest that plaintiffs damages evidence will be highly complex and note that there were numerous doctors who treated plaintiff during the months he was hospitalized at Sacramento Medical Center, Mercy and the rehabilitation facilities. However, plaintiff’s damages evidence will be streamlined, straightforward and largely undisputed.

First, as noted above, plaintiff intends to call only one doctor from Sacramento Medical Center and one from Mercy, each of whom will explain the nature and extent of Mr. Santoro's head injury and the surgical procedures they performed. A third doctor, Dr. X from Children's Hospital, will explain the tendon release he performed on Mr. Santoro's legs. This is a very straightforward procedure. None on this testimony will be lengthy. While Mr. Santoro's injury was severe, none of the testimony about the injury or his treatment is particularly complex or difficult to understand. And, as noted, there is little dispute about the nature and extent of Mr. Santoro's injury - it is pretty clear cut. There is little disagreement among the parties' medical experts. The only other medical experts will be a neurologist, a neuropsychologist and a life care planner.

Thus, defendants' concern about complexity or an extensive number of witnesses regarding damages will not materialize in reality. A single trial will be efficient and take far less court and juror time than a two-phase trial.

Continue reading "Sacramento Man Seeks Damages From Police Dept. For Brain Injury, Part 9 of 9" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

Ends of Justice/Prejudice
Defendants speculate that a single trial may confuse the liability issues or result in prejudice in that a jury might look past liability. However, defendants cite no empirical evidence suggesting that trying liability and damages in a single trial would cause any prejudice to defendants. Certainly the fact that Mr. Santoro suffered a severe injury is no reason to bifurcate. Serious injury cases are tried in the courts of Sacramento County and other counties routinely without bifurcation and with no evidence of prejudice to defendants.

Jurors are routinely instructed they must find liability before considering damages and they appear to do so with little problem. Defendants offer speculation, but no evidence to the contrary. Further, as discussed above, the jury in this case would be aware of the seriousness of the injury in the liability phase in any event. The issue will be discussed in voir dire, as will many issues relating to Mr. Santoro' injury and damages, for there is only one opportunity to voir dire the jury before it is empaneled. See Bly-Magee v. Budget Rent-A-Car 24 Cal.App.4th 318, 332-344 (1994).

Further, the fact that Mr. Santoro suffered a fractured skull, a severe brain injury and was in a coma for weeks, etc. will be admissible on the amount of force used, to show that the amount of force used was unreasonable and excessive. Similarly, Mr. Santoro's injury must be discussed to some extent by medical professionals to explain to the jury why Mr. Santoro's memory loss is so extensive and, importantly, that his inability to recall any part of this incident is real and not feigned.

Continue reading "Severely Injured Sacramento Man Sues Police Officer, Part 8 of 9" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

B. Economy and Efficiency
The above discussion highlights the fact that far from promoting economy and efficiency, bifurcation would add significantly to the time and expense of litigating this case and would add significantly to the logistical difficulties of scheduling and re-scheduling witnesses, including experts, some of whom will have to testify twice.

In terms of economy, there is little question that a second trial will occur in this matter, particularly given the fact that comparative fault will apply. Given the number of procedures and training guidelines violated by Officer Doe and the extreme amount of force he applied to Mr. Santoro under very benign circumstances, it is most unlikely that a jury would not assign some percentage of fault to Officer Doe, if not a substantial percentage.

Not only would a second trial require several witnesses to testify twice, second opening statements, closing arguments, jury instructions and jury deliberations would be necessary. This would extend this trial well beyond the time necessary to conduct a single trial. This would not serve the goal of judicial economy at all. A single trial will not be much longer than a bifurcated liability phase, particularly since there is very little dispute among the experts about Mr. Santoro's damages. Indeed, the defense neuropsychologist has recently testified that Mr. Santoro has greater deficits and will need more care during his life than plaintiffs expert.

Continue reading "Saramento Beating Victim Suffers Brain Injury, Part 7 of 9" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

A. CONVENIENCE OF WITNESSES
As mentioned, plaintiff intends to call one of the neurosurgeons who treated him at Sacramento Medical Center and another who treated him at Mercy. Both of these surgeons performed operations on Mr. Santoro at different times and for different reasons. Both will testify about the extent and severity of the head injury Mr. Santoro sustained, as well as the fact that an extreme amount of force was required to cause this level of injury.

This evidence is a critical piece of plaintiff's proof in the liability phase. One of plaintiffs causes of action is for battery by Officer Doe. The crux of this claim is whether the force used by the officer was unreasonable or excessive under the circumstances. See, e.g., CACI Instruction No. 1305; Edson v. City of Aneheim, 63 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1272 [in action for battery against a police officer, plaintiff has burden of proving unreasonable force by the officer].

The nature and extent of the injury, as well as testimony about the amount of force that would be necessary to cause such an injury, is relevant and admissible on this issue.

Of course, both of these doctors will have additional testimony on the issue of damages. Bifurcation would therefore require that both testify twice, which would be highly inconvenient and unnecessarily expensive.

Continue reading "Beating Victim In Sacramento Files Claim Against Sacramento Police Dept., Part 6 of 9" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

THE COURT SHOULD NOT ORDER BIFURCATION ON ITS OWN MOTION
Although defendants motion is untimely as discussed above, the Court retains discretion to order bifurcation on its own motion at any time when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby . CCP §§ 598; see also, CCP § 1048(b).

In the present case, none of these ends would be served by conducting two separate trials, one on liability and one on damages, for several reasons to be discussed below. First, however, it should be noted that plaintiff has no intention of calling an extensive number of the physicians who treated him. Indeed, Plaintiff plans to call only one of the doctors who treated him at Sacramento Medical Center and only one who treated him at Mercy Hospital. Each will be relatively short - no more than one hour of direct testimony and probably less. Moreover, as discussed further below, each of these doctors will be testifying on the issue of liability in any event, and would have to come back to testify a second time if the case were bifurcated.

Continue reading "Sacramento Plaintiff Files Action For Brain Injuries, Part 5 of 9" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION IS UNTIMELY
Code of Civil Procedure § 598 provides that a motion to bifurcate brought by a party must be noticed and set for hearing far enough in advance of the trial so that an order for bifurcation, if appropriate, may be obtained no later than the pretrial conference or, in other cases, no later than 30 days before the trial date. C.C.P. § 598;

Although the Court retains discretion to order bifurcation on its own motion, the notice and hearing deadline provided in CCP § 598 is no small matter. For example, in the present case, plaintiffs counsel have been preparing for trial and scheduling witnesses, including expert witnesses, for a single trial. Defendants never mentioned or hinted that they desired bifurcation until new counsel entered the case and this motion was filed. Notably, the motion was filed with the trial date imminent and with a hearing date for the motion on the trial date itself, June 6, 2008. This is well beyond the deadline for such motions specified in CCP § 598.

Equally significant is the fact that the Rules of Court provide that the issue of bifurcation, if desired or applicable, should be taken up months before the trial, at the Case Management Conference. (See California Rules of Court, Rule3.727(10).

In their Case Management Conference Statement filed for the Case Management Conference on June 20, 2007 nearly one year ago, Defendants mentioned nothing about seeking bifurcation, and specifically left blank the section of the CMC Statement that is to be checked where a party is contemplating bifurcation. Nor did defendants suggest they would seek bifurcation at either of the Case Management Conferences (June 20, 2007 and August 31, 2007). Clearly, the rules contemplate that such a motion be heard and ruled upon well before trial.

Continue reading "Injured Sacramento Man Files Claim Against Police Officer, Part 4 of 9" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

Mr. Santoro suffered a severe skull fracture, which caused substantial bleeding, bruising and swelling in his brain. He was in a coma, near death, for nearly a month. He had two operations in an attempt to relieve the bleeding, swelling and fluid in his brain. In the second operation it was necessary to remove parts of the temporal and frontal lobes of his brain. A total of ten centimeters of brain tissue had to be removed from Mr. Santoro' frontal lobes (referred to as a lobectomy, the equivalent of a lobotomy. While Mr. Santoro' life was saved, he has sustained permanent brain damage and will need life-long care. He was hospitalized for a total of over eight months and has incurred well over $1.5 million in medical bills. He has not returned to work and now lives with his parents and brothers, all of whom have assisted in his care.

At the very minimum this is a case of comparative fault and plaintiffs d images will clearly have to be litigated.

Earlier in the evening, Mr. Santoro and one of his friends, Paul Thomas, agreed to meet after work Downtown to watch the Rose Bowl football game which, that year, was the national championship game played in the evening between U.S.C. and Texas. A third friend, Danny Jones, joined them later in the evening.

Mr. Santoro and his friends had dinner and watched the game at an East Sac. restaurant then moved to a pub next door after dinner to watch the remainder of the game. Mr. Santoro had several beers over the course of several hours, but was not drunk and was not driving.

At approximately 11:30 p.m. Mr. Santoro and his friends were walking to Mr.Thomas' car intending to go home. As they walked along Market Street two men, unknown to Mr. Santoro and his friends, were walking behind them and began harassing them. Mr. Santoro and his friends crossed Market Street hoping to avoid these men but the men followed them across the street. By this time Mr.Thomas, who was walking faster, was several feet ahead.

The two men continued harassing Mr. Santoro and Mr. Hernandez and eventually started a light with them. Mr.Thomas returned to assist and saw Mr. Santoro on the ground with one of the assailants on top of Mr. Santoro. He pulled the man off of Mr. Santoro.

Officer Doe at this point drove to the scene and hit his siren as he pulled up. The fighting stopped and Mr. Santoro began jogging away.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY OF FACTS cont.
Defendants' own police procedures expert has testified that it was improper for Officer Doe to fail to notify dispatch of what he had upon arrival. Officer Doe himself has testified that he was out of his car, in the presence of five unknown males, for about five seconds when one of the men (plaintiff James Santoro) turned and began to lope away. Officer Doe testified that within one second he started to chase Santoro without knowing who the aggressors were and knowing very little about any of the five involved. The crime Officer Doe was investigating was a simple misdemeanor P.C. § 415 (fighting in public).

Officer Doe ran right past the four other men, including the two who instigated the fight. In doing so, he violated proper police protocols and clear training guidelines.

Officer Doe ran about 100 feet toward Mr. Santoro. Witnesses will testify that Officer Doe yelled stop once or twice, and nothing else. Officer Doe claims he yelled numerous times. James Santoro, complying with Officer Doe' requests, stops and turns around. As he does so, Officer Doe hits Mr. Santoro in the chest with both hands, with great force. Mr. Santoro flies backward.

Officer Doe hit Mr. Santoro with such force that Mr. Santoro' body flew into the air. According to Officer Doe and an independent eye witness who was six feet away, Mr. Santoro' legs flew up in front of his body, which was now parallel to the ground, flying backward. Mr. Santoro was unable to break his fall in any way. His back hit the sidewalk and his head snapped back onto the pavement with great force, causing a loud smack which, according to the eye witness, sounded like a melon smashing onto the pavement. Mr. Santoro' head bounced up and smacked onto the pavement a second time due to the force with which he was hit.

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Continue reading "Sacramento Police Officer Responsible For Brain Injury To Local Man, Part 2 of 9" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this brain injury case and its proceedings.)

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate Liability from Damages

INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY OF FACTS
The plaintiff, James Santoro, is a 28 year old life long resident of Sacramento and law abiding member of the community. Before this incident he had never been arrested or had any negative contact with law enforcement. His family has been in Sacramento for three generations. His father and mother were both born in Sacramento and come from families that have always been hard working, law abiding members of the Sacramento community.

At the time of the incident Mr. Santoro was working as a file clerk for a large law firm in downtown Sacramento. Mr. Santoro had been working there for approximately two years and was an exemplary employee, well liked and well respected by all members of the firm. Prior to working for his current firm worked as a file clerk for another well-respected large law firm in Sacramento.

Sacramento police officer John Doe joined the police department in 2002 and completed his POST training and his field training with SPD in 2003. His training included training in patrol techniques, crimes in progress and foot pursuits.

January 4, 2006 was the night of the national championship football game at the Rose Bowl between U.S.C. and Texas. Many people were in the East Sac. area of downtown Sacramento to watch the game at one of the many restaurants and bars in the area.

Continue reading "Sacramento Man Suffers Brain Injury At Hands Of Police, Part 1 of 9" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

H. Universal Fails to Negate Plaintiffs' Fraud/Conspiracy and Punitive Damages Claims
To satisfy its initial burden, Universal must either negate a necessary element of each of plaintiffs' causes of action or demonstrate that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the process of trial. [Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673-674.] Universal fails to show with competent evidence any lack of proof that Tina Gomez was exposed to Universal's asbestos-containing, or otherwise, defective product. Regardless, plaintiffs need not prove that Ms. Gomez was exposed to asbestos from Universal products to recover against Universal for injuries stemming from its participation in a conspiracy to suppress from Ms. Gomez, and others similarly situated, material information about asbestos-related health hazards. Hence, Universal may be liable to plaintiffs here from Ms. Gomez's exposure to any asbestos from any source as a result of the conspiracy in which Universal participated.

The elements of a civil conspiracy are an agreement, a wrongful act by any of the conspirators pursuant to the agreement, and damages. [Stone v. Regents of University of Cal. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 736, 748 fn. 9 (emphasis added).] The active concealment of facts by even a non-fiduciary (such as Universal here) is the equivalent of a false representation, i.e., actual fraud. [5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading § 678, p. 136 (emphasis added).] In a case directly on point, it was held that a viable fraud cause of action was stated against multiple defendants who were accused of having intentionally concealed the ingredients of a defective product. [Quirici v. Freeman (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 194, 201; Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 964; Committee on Children's Television v. General Foods (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 218-219.]

Likewise, punitive damages may be based upon fraudulent conduct, and upon a defendant's knowing failure to warn of hazards. [Civ. Code § 3294; Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 40091.]

Universal shows no lack of proof that it knowingly concealed asbestos-related hazards associated with its products. Indeed, none of the 26 purported facts in Universal's separate statement address, involve, or discuss plaintiffs' fraud, conspiracy-to-defraud and punitive damages claims.

Continue reading "Personal Injury Action Filed On Behalf of Roseville Woman, Part 14 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

G. Universal Fails to Negate Plaintiffs' Premises Liability Claims
Universal fails to show any lack of proof that it: (1) required the use of any asbestos-containing products at the West Facility; (2) managed the operative details of David Plaza's work such that the asbestos-containing dust on his person and clothes exposed Tina Gomez to asbestos; (3) negligently failed to warn or abate concealed hazards; or (4) negligently hired or managed other workers that negligently handled asbestos-containing materials.

Universal ignores that it owned and operated the West Facility when David Plaza performed brake work, which inevitably included the removal and installation of asbestos-containing brakes, at that store during 1981 through March 1982. As Universal's PMK and counsel readily admit, Universal controlled the operative details of the work at the West Facility when that store was company owned. Thus, triable factual issues exist as to whether Universal is liable for negligently: (1) exercising the control it retained of the work at the West Facility that eventually exposed Tina Gomez to asbestos; and (2) failing to warn of or abate concealed asbestos-related defects. [Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659; Grahn v. Tosco Corp. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1373.]

.

Continue reading "Wrongful Death Suit Due To Mesothelioma Filed Against Roseville Tire Company, Part 13 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

F. Universal Exercised Complete or Substantial Control Over the Franchisee
Courts focus on the right to control in determining whether a true agency relationship exists between a franchisor and franchisee. [Wickham v. Southland Corp. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 49, 59; Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc. (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 610, 613.] If the franchise agreement gives the franchisor the right of complete or substantial control over the franchisee, an agency relationship exists. [I]t is the right to control the means and manner in which the result is achieved that is significant in determining whether a principal-agency relationship exists. [Cislaw v. Southland Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1288 (emphasis in original).] The inquiry on this point is a factual one that rests on the extent to which the franchisor retained and exercised control of the operational details of the franchisee's business. [Id. at 1292-1296.]

Universal fails to show with any admissible evidence that the West Facility was a Universal franchise during 1982 and 1983. California case law is clear that an agency relationship does not exist between a franchisor and a franchisee unless the franchise agreement gives the franchisor the right of complete or substantial control over the franchisee. [Cislaw, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1288.] Universal fails to provide a copy of any franchise agreement for the West Facility. This is no small matter because the terms of the agreement determine whether the franchisee acted as an agent of the franchisor. [Id. at 1288, 1294-1295.] Based on the testimony of Linda Snowball, Richard Leevers and Edwin Ferguson, it is questionable whether a West Facility Franchise Agreement even exists.

Instead of presenting a franchise agreement for the West Facility, Universal instead relies on the inadmissible declarations of Richard Stein and David Ferguson, an exemplar of a franchise agreement for the Baldwin Facility and a copy of the West Facility Sublease. Such evidence is insufficient. Without a franchise agreement for the West Facility, this Court is in no position to determine whether: (1) the West Facility was, in fact, a Universal franchise; or (2) the terms of a franchise agreement for the West Facility, if it exists, are substantially the same as the Baldwin Facility Franchise Agreement.

The discovery issues presented here are common to most personal injury cases.)

Continue reading "Sacramento-Area Family Sues Tire Company for Causing Mesothelioma, Part 12 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

E. Universal Fails to Negate Decedent's Asbestos Exposure from 1981 to 1982
Universal in its motion makes no mention of Tina Gomez's alleged exposure to asbestos when David Plaza worked at the Universal-owned and operated West Facility from 1981 to March 1982. Universal admits that it owned and operated the West until March 1, 1982. The West Facility Sublease between Universal and Unity confirms this because the lease term began on March 1, 1982. Universal shows no lack of proof that, assuming it exposed Tina Gomez to asbestos from 1981 to March 1982, such exposure in reasonable medical probability was a substantial factor in increasing the risk of her developing the mesothelioma that killed her.
Universal submits no evidence to the contrary. First, Universal provides no franchise agreement for the West Facility. Second, Universal's former employees, Richard Leevers and Edwin Ferguson, and Custodian of Records, Linda Snowball, do not recall ever seeing such a franchise agreement. Third, paragraph seven of the Leevers Declaration is based on the hearsay statements of Jeff Gordon, rather than from Mr. Leevers' personal knowledge. .

Continue reading "Asbestos Work Products Leads To Mesothelioma For Sacramento-Area Couple, Part 11 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

C. Universal Fails to Meet Its Initial Burden in Moving for Summary Judgment
Universal in its moving papers was required to affirmatively establish not only that plaintiffs do not have a prima facie cause of action, but also that plaintiffs cannot reasonably expect to present one at trial. [Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.] Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(p)(2) precludes the burden of producing evidence of a triable factual issue from ever shifting to a plaintiff unless the moving defendant first makes the required showing that one or more elements of each cause of action cannot be established. [Scheiding, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 70.] Universal fails to establish that it ever propounded state-all-facts interrogatories or simply comprehensive discovery eliciting all of plaintiffs' evidence in support of all of the complaint's causes of action. It therefore follows that Universal does not show that plaintiffs served factually devoid responses to any such all-encompassing discovery. [Id.] This deficiency in itself requires that the motion be denied.[FN5]

D. Universal is Liable Under a Strict Products Liability Theory
There are triable factual issues as to whether Universal is liable to plaintiffs under a strict liability theory - either on a consumer expectation defect or a failure to warn theory. Universal mistakenly asserts that it is not subject to the complaint's strict liability cause of action because it did not supply any asbestos-containing product to the West Facility. However, Universal ignores the fact that its stores serviced and sold brakes.

California has adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A. [Barth v. B.F.Goodrich Tire Co. (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 228, 250.] It applies to any person engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption which includes any manufacturer, wholesale or retail dealer or distributor. [Id. at com. f.]

Continue reading "Roseville Tire Company Exposed Couple To Asbestos, Part 10 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

B. Universal's Motion for Summary Adjudication is Fatally Flawed
Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(f)(1) only permits courts to summarily adjudicate that one or more causes of action has no merit, there is no defense to one or more causes of action, a claim for punitive damages has no merit, or one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff. When summary adjudication is sought, both the moving party's notice of motion and separate statement must specify verbatim the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty sought to be adjudicated and the separate statement must tie each undisputed material fact to the particular claim, defense or issue sought to be adjudicated. [Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1350(b), (d) and (h).] There is a very important reason for these requirements: A party opposing a summary-adjudication motion is entitled to notice not only of the causes of action, claims or issues in dispute, but also of the alleged facts and evidence purportedly supporting summary adjudication of each such cause of action, claim or issue. [Gonzales v. Super. Ct. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1546.] Universal in its Notice of Motion fails to state the specific cause(s) of action, affirmative defense(s), claim(s) for damages, or issue(s) of duty for which adjudication is sought.

(The discovery issues presented here are common to most personal injury cases.)

Continue reading "Sacramento-Area Woman Dies From Mesothelioma, Part 9 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

DISCUSSION

A. Moving Defendant's Burden of Proof
A party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.] This means the moving defendant must persuade the court that if the defendant's evidence is uncontroverted, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the plaintiff. [Id. at 851.] Only if the defendant makes that showing does the burden shift to plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. [Id.]

A defendant has not met its burden unless it has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence. [Id. at 854 (emphasis in original).] A moving defendant must make an affirmative showing that the plaintiff lacks the needed evidence; simply pointing to a claimed absence is not enough. [Id. at 854-855.] In ruling on the motion, the court must consider and view, in the light most favorable to the opposing party, all of the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom. [Id. at 844.] Declarations of the moving party are strictly construed, while declarations of the party opposing the motion are liberally construed. [Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832.]

Nor is it enough to merely assert that plaintiff failed to provide detailed information. The defendant must prove that plaintiffs failed to provide meaningful responses to comprehensive interrogatories designed to elicit all the evidence plaintiffs had to support their contention of liability. [Weber v. John Crane, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1442; see also Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64 (burden did not shift where the interrogatories contained no questions aimed specifically at the presence or absence of the defendant at jobsites).] Also, the moving party must demonstrate ... that there is no evidence to support an element of the opponent's case ... If a party contends some particular issue of fact has no support in the record, it must set forth all the material evidence on the point and not merely the evidence favorable to it. [Rio Linda Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 732, 740-741.]

(The discovery issues presented here are common to most personal injury cases.)

Continue reading "Asbestos Exposure Leads To Mesothelioma For Roseville Couple, Part 8 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

E. Outstanding Discovery
Plaintiffs have not concluded the depositions of Universal's PMK and custodian of records. Universal's designated PMK, Edwin Ferguson, admitted that he has no knowledge about, among other topics, whether Universal had any agreements, provided manuals, imposed requirements on the purchase of asbestos-containing products and provided information about the handling and health hazards of asbestos to the West Facility. Indeed, other than briefly reviewing three documents, Mr. Ferguson did nothing to prepare for his deposition. This comes as no surprise since Mr. Ferguson first heard that he was being designated as Universal's PMK on the day of his deposition. Also, during the deposition of Universal's designated custodian of records, Linda Snowball, she testified that she has not searched for documents listed in Categories 5 through 17 of plaintiffs' custodian of records deposition notice. These include documents about Universal's control and supervision of the West Facility, as well as information about any asbestos-containing products used there. If the parties are still at an impasse after the meet-and-confer process, plaintiffs will move to compel.

On April 1, 6, 23 and 27, 2009, plaintiffs subpoenaed the deposition of Unity's owner, Jimmy Arnold. Plaintiffs' process server conducted several hours of surveillance on Mr. Arnold's business and gated residence, and have made several attempts to personally serve Mr. Arnold with the subpoena. In fact, Mr. Arnold has continuously evaded service by ignoring and refusing to allow the process server to enter his gated home. Plaintiffs will re-effectuate service on Mr. Arnold in the coming days so that his June 1, 2009, deposition will go forward.
All of the aforementioned pending discovery may well produce evidence confirming, among other things, that: (l) David Plaza worked at the West Facility from 1981 through 1983; (2) the West Facility was either a Universal-owned or franchisee-owned store during the relevant time period; (3) Universal controlled the day-to-day operations of the West Facility; (4) Universal supplied asbestos-containing products to the West Facility;

Continue reading "Roseville Tire And Rubber Company Sued For Asbestos Exposure, Part 7 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

4. Universal's Oversight of its Franchises
Universal's District Managers, Territory Sales Managers and Business Counselors personally visited franchisees on a regular basis to advise the franchisee on how to run a profitable business. In fact, it was important that the franchise tire center and Universal work together so they could make a profit so they can stay in business.

The District Managers and Territory Sales Managers worked with franchisees to ensure that the franchise had a balanced inventory of Universal products. The District Managers and Territory Sales Managers also told the franchisees of upcoming Universal promotions and which Universal products the franchisee needed to support those promotions. Universal's advertising department was in charge of all promotions for all Universal stores, including franchises. Jimmy Arnold of Unity always participated in Universal's sales promotions. Indeed, Universal never had a problem with a franchisee participating in Universal's promotions.

Universal's Business Counselors acted as business consultants to the franchisee. The Business Counselors oversaw whether the franchise operated like a Universal-owned store and followed Universal's standards. This includes control of the franchise employee's behavior and work practices. For example, if a franchise employee was the subject of customer complaints, Universal notified the dealer so in that way, [Universal] would try to control what he was doing, you know, the dealer. [Id.] Further, Business Counselors advised the franchisees to send their employees to Universal-certified classes or schools and receive National Institute for Automotive Service Excellence ( ASE ) certification. Universal-trained mechanics and representatives from brake manufacturers, such as Bendix and Raybestos, instructed franchise service personnel on how to remove and install brakes.

(The discovery issues presented here are common to most personal injury cases.)

Continue reading "Family Of Woman From Roseville Sues Tire Company, For Part 6 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of this wrongful death case and its proceedings.)

D. Universal Exercised Complete or Substantial Control Over its Franchises

Universal first started franchising its stores in 1972 to further merchandise its products and increase profits. Universal wanted its franchises to operate along the same lines as Universal's stores and Universal made sure that its customers cannot tell the difference between whether a particular Universal store was company- or franchisee-owned. Indeed, if a Universal franchisee went out of business, Universal then operated the store as a company-owned store. Universal placed certain mechanisms in its subleases, franchise agreements and Management Manual ( Universal Manual ) to ensure that its franchises operated and appeared the same as Universal-owned stores. Also, Universal employees regularly inspected and advised the franchises to ensure profitability and compliance with Universal's standards.

3. Universal's Management Manual
Universal required its franchisees to operate according to the Universal Manual. The Universal Manual outlined good business practices for the franchisee to follow to ensure profitability. Indeed, if a franchisee willfully or negligently deviated from the high quality service and maintenance standards set forth in the Universal Manual, Universal could terminate the franchise agreement. The Universal Manual required the franchisee to:
1. Follow Image Standards that included the maintenance and cleanliness of the facility;
2. Hire the most qualified and competent employees;
3. Train its employees on a daily on-going basis with, among other things, Universal's complete range of training materials ;
4. Purchase necessary training aids and to make training time available to employees ;

(The discovery issues presented in this personal injury case are common to most civil cases.)

Continue reading "Asbestos Exposure Leads To Suit Against Roseville Company, Part 5 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

B. Universal Exposed Tina Gomez to Asbestos

Decedent Tina Gomez met David Plaza during the summer of 1981. They soon began an 18-month relationship with Mr. Plaza living in Ms. Gomez's home and working as a mechanic at the West Facility.

Universal admits it owned and operated the West Facility until March 1, 1982. As Universal's counsel and its person most knowledgeable ( PMK ) candidly admit, if Universal owned and operated a tire and automotive center, such as the West Facility, Universal thus controlled the operative details of the work, conduct, and safety of its employees. After March 1, 1982, Universal subleased the West Facility to Unity. The West Facility had a retail space, store room area and a mechanical space with six repair bays. Mr. Plaza worked five days a week, eight hours a day, at the West Facility during the entire time he lived with Ms. Gomez. Mr. Plaza lived with Ms. Gomez at least five or six months before Universal subleased the West Facility in March 1982.

Universal manufactures and distributes various automotive products. Universal stores removed and installed asbestos-containing automobile brake linings as part of its brake service. The primary brands Universal purchased through suppliers included Wagner, Raybestos, and Bendix. Tina Gomez visited David Plaza at the West Facility at least twice a week. She saw him work on brakes and saw brake boxes on the floor of the West Facility near Mr. Plaza.
When they lived together, Tina Gomez saw David Plaza wear his work clothes every day. He had five uniforms, one for each work day, consisting of a pair of pants and a light-blue shirt that bore the Universal logo. After he came home from work, Mr. Plaza piled his filthy and dusty work clothes either in the bedroom or garage where they remained until Ms. Gomez washed them on Saturday. Ms. Gomez laundered Mr. Plaza's work clothes every week using the washer and dryer in her home. The washer and dryer were located within two feet of the bedroom. She always washed Mr. Plaza's work clothes as a separate load because they were really bad and grungy. The dust on the worn work clothes was dark and blackish. She shook the dust off of the work clothes in the garage.

Continue reading "Sacramento-Area Man Exposes Girlfriend To Work-Related Asbestos, Part 4 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Plaintiffs' enterprise/market-share liability causes of action allege that the nature of the asbestos-products industry and market were such that decedent Tina Gomez likely used or was exposed to each defendant's fungible products; defendants, including Universal, cooperated in the manufacture, design and labeling of a uniformly defective product and knowingly adhered to an industry-wide safety standard that failed to warn plaintiffs and others of the disease hazard posed by ordinary uses of their products; defendants delegated research, investigative and other safety functions to various trade associations and industry leaders who failed to adequately investigate the risks caused by the use of asbestos, and actively minimized and suppressed the publication of information showing that asbestos is hazardous; and defendants jointly created and controlled the risk that was the proximate cause of the mesothelioma that killed Ms. Gomez. Nowhere in Universal's separate statement does it negate, let alone address, that its asbestos-containing products were fungible ; that plaintiffs joined in this lawsuit the makers of a substantial percentage of those products; or that plaintiffs lack evidence in support of any essential element of the complaint's enterprise/market-share liability causes of action.

Nowhere in its separate statement does Universal reference any purported facts contained in the Declaration of Betty McElroy. Ms. McElroy searched Universal's employment records for information regarding David Plaza, but she did not search for Mr. Plaza's true first name, Lawrence. Although she had access to and can search for Mr. Plaza's employment records using his Social Security Number, she did not do so.

Continue reading "Lawsuit Filed After Roseville Couple Exposed To AsbestosPart 3 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Complaint and Universal's Separate Statement
Plaintiffs' complaint filed August 24, 2007, alleges causes of action for personal injuries (survivorship), wrongful death, negligence, breach of implied warranty, strict liability ( consumer expectation and failure-to-warn defects), fraud and conspiracy, alternative-enterprise and concert-of-action liability, and premises liability against several defendants, including Universal. In their complaint, plaintiffs allege, among other things, that decedent Tina Gomez was exposed to asbestos taken from the premises of the West Facility on the person of David Plaza from 1981 through 1983. Universal is a defendant in 26 of the complaint's causes of action including, among others, fraud, conspiracy-to-defraud and concert-of-action.

Nowhere in Universal's moving papers does it show that it ever propounded any comprehensive discovery seeking all of plaintiffs' facts, witnesses and evidence in support of each cause of action. Nor does Universal in its motion show that plaintiffs served factually devoid responses to any such discovery. [Id.]

Plaintiffs' conspiracy-to-defraud and concert-of-action claims allege that: all products defendants (including Universal) acted as one another's agents; knew of the health hazards stemming from human exposure to asbestos as early as 1924; suppressed and misstated the information when there was a duty to disclose and warn of those hazards; and, as a result, Tina Gomez was exposed to the asbestos that caused the mesothelioma that killed her. Those causes of action allege liability upon proof of Ms. Gomez's exposure to asbestos from any source (and not necessarily from a Universal product). [Id.]

Continue reading "Roseville Family Sues For Wrongful Death, Part 2 of 14" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Opposition to the Universal Tire & Rubber Company's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

I. INTRODUCTION
The Universal Tire Company ( Universal ) in moving for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication ignores that it has the initial burden to prove that plaintiffs lack and cannot obtain evidence in support of at least one essential element of every cause of action. Universal fails to prove that it propounded comprehensive discovery seeking all information in support of plaintiffs' claims or that plaintiffs provided factually devoid responses. Also, while Universal asserts an absence of evidence of decedent Tina Gomez's exposure to asbestos from March 1982 to 1983, it ignores her alleged exposure to asbestos from Universal's products and negligence between 1981 and March 1982. Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Gomez was exposed to asbestos through live-in boyfriend David Plaza who brought home toxic asbestos dust from a Universal service center on West Avenue in Roseville, California ( West Facility ). Universal admits that it owned and operated the West Avenue facility until March 1982, its company-owned stores removed and installed asbestos-containing brakes and Universal controlled the operative details of the work at its company-owned stores. Mr. Plaza did brake work at the West Facility and he came home to Ms. Gomez in a Universal uniform laden with black dust. She shook the dust off his uniforms and washed them once a week. Universal fails to negate or show any lack of proof that Ms. Gomez's exposure to asbestos while Universal owned the West Facility between 1981 and March 1982 was a legal cause of the mesothelioma that killed her.Univeral's motion is fatally flawed in other respects. First, Universal ignores that it is liable under a strict products liability theory because its role as an installer and seller of asbestos-containing brakes places it in the vertical chain of distribution of a defective product. Second, Universal offers no admissible evidence to support its claim that, as a franchisor, it did not control the operative details of the work at the West Facility.

Continue reading "Sacramento-area Tire Company Sued For Wrongful Death, Part 1 of 14" »

As it prepares to celebrate the 50th anniversary of hosting the Winter Olympics, a tight-knit Sierra Nevada ski community is mourning another loss in an unusual string of tragedies this season.

A skier's deadly collision with a tree Thursday at California's Squaw Valley USA resort is the latest in the series that involves two other skiers killed in avalanches and nine deaths in all.

Off the slopes, a shuttle bus crash killed a resort employee in April, and three young women hoping to get seasonal jobs died of carbon monoxide poisoning in December while sleeping in a car just outside the resort.

Extreme skier Shane McConkey of Squaw Valley died in March while jumping off a cliff with a parachute in Italy. And Dave Pedersen, the resort's race services director, died of cancer in February.

"To say this has been a year of tragedy is an understatement," said Savannah Cowley, a resort spokeswoman. "It has been tragedies that have really, really struck our community. This is unprecedented as far as the grief this mountain has gone through."

Pete Bansen, Squaw Valley's fire chief, said he can't recall as many different kinds of fatalities in his 30 years in the resort community.

The avalanches – one killing ski patrol member Andrew Entin, 41, in March, and the other killing Randall Davis, 21, of Tahoe City, in December – were especially rare for Squaw Valley, he said. They were the first inbounds avalanche fatalities at the resort since 1963.

Continue reading "Sierra Ski Resorts Deal With Multiple Deaths And Tragedies" »

On April 9, a federal jury in Sacramento has ordered West Sacramento to pay damages to two sisters from Ghana who were handcuffed during a traffic stop.

Jurors declined to order punitive damages, The Sacramento Bee reported. They ordered $11,700 in compensatory damages to Karene Beecham, who was driving the car, and $21,700 to her sister, Karena Crankson. Because U.S. District Judge John A. Mendez, in an unusual move, found that the sisters' constitutional rights were violated, the jury only had to consider whether they were entitled to damages and how much.

The sisters, with their two young children in the car, were on a sightseeing trip when they were pulled over in 2006 for making a lane change without signaling. Officer Timothy Twardosz, who made the stop, sent a radio message suggesting that the sisters were high-risk, resulting in the arrival of three other officers.

Thethree other officers arrived at the scene in separate cars. With guns drawn, all four officers ordered the women out of their car. One officer had an assault rifle. Another had a pistol in one hand and a leashed police dog in the other. The two women were ordered to lift their shirts to show they were not armed, then handcuffed and placed in the back of separate police vehicles for about 30 minutes.

Beecham and Crankson were detained in the backs of police cars for about half an hour before Beecham was given a ticket and they were allowed to drive off.

Continue reading "Jury Awards Sacramento Women Money For Traffic Stop" »

On Thursday night a man sitting a bus stop in Sacramento was struck and killed by a 17-year-old motorcyclist. The cyclist will be charged with felony gross vehicular manslaughter, evading arrest and driving without a license, authorities said today.

The cyclist, whose name has not been released because he is a minor, remains in Mercy San Juan Hospital, where he is being treated for injuries suffered after leading the CHP on a high-speed chase and crashing into a Sacramento County sheriff's patrol car.

The incident began about 7:40 p.m., when a California Highway Patrol officer writing reports in the parking lot of a Target at Madison Avenue and College Oak Drive saw the motorcyclist speeding along Madison Avenue, CHP spokeswoman Liz Dutton said. The officer engaged in a pursuit heading west on Madison across the Highway 80 overpass. The cyclist was traveling an estimated 90 mph on a street with a 45 mph limit.

Near Hillsdale Boulevard, the motorcyclist signaled to the pursuing officer that he was going to stop but then sped up and ran a red light at the intersection with Jackson Street, Dutton said. There the cyclist collided with the sheriff's car.

Continue reading "Sacramento Bystander Struck And Killed By Motorcyclist" »

There was an interesting piece in the New York Times last week about the business of independent medical exams (IMEs) of injured workers who had filed claims against their employers. The story detailed the pressure often placed on the physicians conducting the exams to produce a report that is favorable to the insurance company, who also happens to be paying the physician's fee. Not everybody believes the system is broken, but the apparent conflict of interest does raise several red flags.

The obvious victim in this situation is the injured worker. The Times piece focused on New York state's workers' compensation system And that system's deficiencies is no different here in the Sacramento area, and throughout California.

The independent exams are designed to flush out workers who exaggerate injuries or get unnecessary care, and there is no question that some of that goes on. As a check on what a worker’s doctor determines, insurers are allowed to order an ostensibly neutral exam by a doctor they select and pay for. They do so regularly, with more than 100,000 exams conducted in New York state each year. The numbers are just as high in California.

Continue reading "NY Investigation Of Independent Medical Exams Affects California Injury Claims" »